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ABSTRACT 
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Major Department: Economics 
 
 The United States enjoys a per-capita gross domestic product more than five times the 
size of Mexico (World Bank, 2015). Yet the immigration policies of the United States fail to 
recognize the incentives workers in Mexico have to immigrate, legally or otherwise, into the 
United States. The law alone fails to control the movement of people across a 1,900-mile land 
border. Immigration has contributed to the economic and cultural dynamism of the United States. 
In the short-run, it may create economic winners and losers, leading to domestic tension.  
 After Congress debated and then rejected President George W. Bush’s immigration 
overhaul in 2007, state governments started adopting laws and rules targeting illegal immigrants. 
Many of those laws forced employers to use the electronic E-Verify system to check whether 
prospective hires were eligible to work in the United States. Typically, the primary goal was to 
bar illegal immigrants from the workforce. Additional goals included boosting the employment 
prospects and earnings of legal residents, and encouraging illegal immigrants to voluntarily leave 
markets governed by E-Verify requirements. Politicians focused particular attention on the U.S. 
agricultural industry, which is not surprising since U.S. Department of Agriculture surveys show 
roughly half the agricultural workforce is working in the country illegally. Farmers say they hire 
illegal workers because they cannot find enough U.S. workers to harvest labor-intensive produce 
and livestock. 
 Supporters of the E-Verify law in Georgia said one of their policy goals was to encourage 
farmers to secure legal, foreign laborers through the federally run H2A visa program. The H2A 
system allows growers facing domestic labor shortages to import foreign laborers for up to 10 
months, though the program is bureaucratically cumbersome and requires that cost-sensitive 
growers pay above-market wages.  
 To determine whether E-Verify laws encourage H2A use, the author reviewed every state 
E-Verify law affecting the agricultural industry. After aggregating H2A usage data at the state 
level, the author conducted a fixed-effects regression that controls for years, monthly seasonal 
fluctuations, state effects, H2A wage costs, and the relative strength of a state’s E-Verify law. 
While there is anecdotal evidence that E-Verify laws may disrupt labor markets, there is little 
statistical evidence that state E-Verify laws cause farmers to increasingly rely on the H2A 
system. Surprisingly, there is statistical evidence that the strictest E-Verify laws may reduce 
H2A usage. 
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Introduction 
 The United States enjoys a per-capita gross domestic product more than five times the 
size of Mexico (World Bank, 2015). The two countries share a roughly 1,900-mile land border. 
Yet the immigration policies of the United States fail to recognize the incentives that draw 
workers from Mexico and South America to the United States, legally or otherwise. Immigration 
has undoubtedly contributed to the economic and cultural dynamism of the United States. It also 
creates short-run labor displacement that rewards some and penalizes others. 
 Congress refused President George W. Bush’s plan to overhaul federal immigration laws 
in 2007, contributing to a political stalemate. As the legislation was debated and ultimately 
rejected, state governments from tiny Rhode Island to Georgia began passing laws or adopting 
rules requiring employers to use an electronic system called E-Verify to check whether 
prospective hires were legal residents and therefore eligible for work. 
 Politicians focused particular attention on the U.S. agricultural industry, where federally 
administered surveys show roughly half of crop workers immigrated illegally into the United 
States (Hertz, 2014). As the E-Verify laws spread, the agricultural lobby warned that E-Verify 
rules could drive away its workforce and inflict economic harm. After witnessing a particularly 
controversial state-led immigration crackdown in Arizona, Georgia’s largest agricultural 
lobbying group, the Georgia Farm Bureau, passed a resolution at its 2010 annual convention 
(Henry, 2010) preemptively warning Georgia’s state lawmakers not to react similarly.  
  “We think immigration is a federal issue, and it needs a federal solution,” said Jon 
Huffmaster, the Farm Bureau’s legislative director. “And we think a patchwork of state laws 
could cause more problems than it solves.” 
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 Farmers routinely complain they cannot find enough U.S.-based workers willing to work 
on their knees in hot, dusty fields to harvest produce that cannot be collected mechanically. 
Migrant workers, some here legally, many not, travel along agricultural corridors during harvest 
season and will readily work in these conditions.  
 E-Verify supporters say farmers can avoid illegal labor if they participate in a federally 
run agricultural guest-worker program known as the H2A system. The U.S. Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 created special categories of guest workers, including agricultural 
laborers, who can be employed in the United States for finite periods. H2A rules set by the U.S. 
Department of Labor (2012) allow farmers to import full-time foreign workers for temporary or 
seasonal jobs lasting up to 10 months.  
 Georgia state Rep. Matt Ramsey, a Republican, introduced legislation requiring many 
farmers and other employers to use the E-Verify system. He acknowledged the growers had an 
alternative to illegal labor through the H2A program. 
 “I continue to be mystified by the suggestion that House Bill 87 will impact the 
agriculture industry's access to a legal workforce. The H2A visa is a system set up by the federal 
government so farmers can lawfully access an unlimited number of foreign workers to come help 
on our farms,” Ramsey wrote (2011) in response to critics. “... The Georgia Peach Council has 
been using it for several years. So can all other growers.” 
 Though the H2A program is an alternative to hiring illegal labor, it is costly to farmers 
and inflexible compared to hiring migrant labor on the open market. To incentivize U.S. growers 
to try hiring U.S. workers, federal law requires that foreign H2A workers receive subsidized 
transportation to the United States, premium wages, and housing. Also, farmers must declare in 
advance where their H2A workers will work and cannot easily shift those foreign workers to 
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alternative work sites if poor weather or growing conditions hamper a harvest. This requirement 
increases the risk that farmers will have to pay H2A workers even if they are idled by conditions 
outside a grower’s control. 
 Farmers have good reason to fear any market change that raises production costs. Since 
growers produce easily substitutable commodities for national or international markets, a slight 
rise in price to offset increased labor costs can lead to steep drop-offs in sales and revenue. For 
example, a 1 percent increase in cucumber prices could prompt a reduction in demand ranging 
from 30 percent to 67 percent, according to a U.S. Department of Agriculture survey of own-
price commodity elasticities (2012). If the cost of labor increases, farmers of commodity 
products must accept either a lower price-cost margin or sell a lot less. 
 Immediately after Georgia’s E-Verify law passed in 2011, there were anecdotal signs of 
potential labor trouble in the agriculture industry. Fliers on Hispanic storefronts in Lyons, 
Georgia, advertised free transportation to field hands willing to pick jalapenos and banana 
peppers in Florida and blueberries in the Carolinas, states that had less-strict or no E-Verify laws 
(Brumback et al., 2011). Suggesting an outflow of workers, farm laborers in Lyons could no 
longer buy same-day bus tickets out of town and instead had to book days in advance. 
 Workers worried about the new law questioned whether they would return to Georgia for 
the 2012 harvest. 
 "I think this law is difficult because they don't want to let us work here. We're not 
delinquents," said Alfredo Perez, who arrived illegally from Mexico in 2008 (Brumback et al., 
2011). Perez said in an interview he typically traveled between Florida, Michigan and Georgia 
picking crops. "We usually come here during onion season, because of the law, we're going to 
have to think about whether or not we'll come back."  
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 Seeking to pressure state leaders into overturning or limiting the law, Georgia farmers 
reported in late June 2011 that they had 11,000 unfilled agricultural jobs, according to an 
informal survey conducted by the Georgia Department of Labor (Henry, 2011a). The results of 
the survey should be viewed with caution. State officials made no effort to survey a 
representative sample of growers, and those with the worst labor problems may have been the 
most likely to respond. It was unknown how many positions had gone vacant in prior years 
before Georgia debated E-Verify laws. Poor working conditions could have contributed to those 
vacancies independent of political action. More than half of the vacant jobs paid less than $9 per 
hour and lasted less than six months. Few growers offered any additional benefits.  
 Reacting to farmer complaints, Georgia Gov. Nathan Deal ordered correction officials to 
identify probationers willing to work for pay harvesting crops. The experiment was short-lived 
and provided little relief for farmers struggling to find labor. The author watched as probationers 
walked off a hot cucumber field in Leslie, Georgia, frustrated by the hard conditions.  
"Tired. The heat," said 33-year-old Tavares Jones, who quit early (Henry, 2011b). "It's hard work 
out here."  
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Literature Review 
 Economists have attempted to quantify the effects of E-Verify laws since states began 
adopting them starting in 2006. A brief summary of that academic work follows. 
 Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak found that E-Verify laws principally reduce the labor 
demand for unauthorized male workers. The probability an undocumented female worker 
remained in a state’s labor force after it adopted an E-Verify law dropped by roughly 7 
percentage points, compared to 3 percentage points for men (Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2012). The 
authors concluded that enactment of E-Verify laws actually raise the share of unauthorized 
workers in the agricultural industry because the sector is exempt from E-Verify in several states.  
 Bohn, Lofstrom and Raphael estimated the adoption of Arizona’s E-Verify law in 2007 
resulted in a statistically significant reduction of the state’s Hispanic noncitizen population 
compared to a synthetic control group representative of Arizona (2011). Using a similar 
difference-in-difference method, the authors also found rental vacancies had increased compared 
to the synthetic control group. The authors considered this significant since past research and 
surveys show illegal immigrants are more likely to live in rental housing than the rest of the 
population. 
 A follow-up study using similar methods concluded that Arizona’s E-Verify law pushed 
likely unauthorized workers from the formal labor sector into the informal labor market, 
including as independent contractors, to dodge E-Verify requirements. Two years after the E-
Verify law was implemented in Arizona, the employment rate of non-citizen Hispanics was 11 to 
12 percentage points lower than comparison states (Bohn et al., 2012). Meanwhile, difference-in-
difference calculations suggested the self-employment rate for non-citizen Hispanic males rose 
8.3 percentage points higher than the synthetic control group. 
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 E-Verify laws targeting private-sector employers reduce pay by roughly 8 percent for 
Mexican workers who fit the profile of likely illegal immigrants (Orrenius et al., 2013). The laws 
did not appear to significantly affect whether men who fit the profile of illegal workers were 
employed. However, employment for women who fit the profile of illegal workers increased by 
3.5 percent. The authors concluded that as E-Verify rules reduced pay for men, women in 
affected households may enter the workforce to recoup lost income. 
This Study’s Contribution 
 Researchers have not studied the potential linkage between state E-Verify laws and 
farmer utilization of the H2A foreign agricultural guest worker program. This study will fill this 
gap in knowledge by applying a fixed-effects OLS regression to data collected by the U.S. 
Department of Labor showing H2A program usage from 2007 through 2014, a period in which 
multiple states adopted various types of E-Verify laws and rules affecting the agriculture 
industry. The results suggest E-Verify laws do very little, if anything, to encourage H2A usage. 
Counterintuitively, the strictest E-Verify laws may actually decrease H2A usage.   
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State E-Verify Laws 
 State governments have adopted a range of laws requiring or promoting use of the E-
Verify system. The review below is based on legislative information compiled by the National 
Conference of State Legislatures (Meyers et al., 2012) and supplemented by the author’s analysis 
of each state law or regulation. A detailed analysis of state laws can be found in Appendix A. 
 For the purpose of this paper, enacted E-Verify laws were assigned to one of five 
qualitative categories.  
 Mandatory E-Verify usage: Most, if not all, agricultural firms in a state must use the E-
Verify system. Violators may be fined, lose state-issued business licenses or be subject to 
specialized judicial oversight and enforcement. Enrolling and using the E-Verify system can give 
firms an affirmative defense against accusations they violated labor laws. 
 Weak E-Verify usage: Some businesses, including some of those in the agricultural 
sector, must use the E-Verify system. However, exemptions and loopholes limit the numbers of 
affected growers. Good-faith usage of the E-Verify system is a defense for growers accused of 
illegally hiring labor. 
 Encouraged E-Verify usage: Laws or rules promote the use of E-Verify by some 
agricultural growers, but they are not required to use it. Using the E-Verify system may give a 
firm or grower an affirmative defense against accusations it violated labor laws.  
 Government E-Verify usage: Only a state government or its political subdivisions must 
use the E-Verify system. In some cases, private firms cannot win or keep government contracts 
unless they use E-Verify. Private firms without government contracts are exempt. It is unlikely 
these requirements would affect many growers.  
 No E-Verify usage: No firm or government must use E-Verify.  
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Table 1: Summary of E-Verify Laws by State 
 
Mandatory Weak Encouraged Government 
Alabama Georgia Louisiana Colorado 
Arizona North Carolina Missouri Florida 
Mississippi 
 
Oklahoma Idaho 
Utah 
 
South Carolina Indiana 
  
Tennessee Michigan 
   
Nebraska 
   
Pennsylvania 
   
Virginia 
   
Rhode Island 
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Data and Methods 
 Differences in how government agencies compile H2A program data make it difficult to 
assemble firm-level panel data describing utilization. Officials at U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services responded to an information request by releasing data for each H2A 
application that showed a petitioner’s federal tax ID number, the business name, the number of 
H2A beneficiaries and the federal fiscal year of the H2A request. The availability of federal tax 
IDs would allow for the high-confidence identification of firms, a task that would otherwise be 
challenging since growers commonly operate under several different business names. However, 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services only tracks where a grower is legally headquartered, 
not where the requested H2A workers will be laboring. Unless the state of employment can be 
identified, one cannot test for the effect of state-specific E-Verify laws. 
 The U.S. Department of Labor keeps a separate but related store of electronic data. Since 
Oct. 1, 2006, departmental officials have reliably published details on each grower’s H2A 
application, including in what state the workers will be employed. Those records also include 
details on the duration of employment, promised wages, and occasionally basic crop information. 
Unfortunately, officials at the U.S. Department of Labor will not release the federal tax IDs or 
other firm-specific identifiers, making it impossible to aggregate the Labor Department data at 
the firm level.  
 For this study, the author used U.S. Department of Labor data to aggregate the number of 
certified workers by state and starting month, producing a dataset of 4,704 observations. Records 
reflecting a maximum of 0.07 percent of H2A workers from 2007 to 2014 were dropped because 
they contained likely data-entry errors that could not be resolved by cross-checking other 
publicly available data, interviewing government officials, or interviewing the applicant. The 
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actual percent of dropped workers may be smaller than 0.07 percent because the author assumed 
that each record lacking worksite information corresponded to a year from 2007 through 2014. In 
reality, some of those problematic records may date prior to 2007, a period beyond the scope of 
this paper.  
 To incorporate wage (labor cost) effects, the author supplemented each observation with 
the applicable Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR) in effect when the certified H2A laborers 
listed in a given observation were scheduled to start working. By law, H2A workers receive 
premium wages, an incentive for cost-sensitive farmers to hire locally before seeking H2A labor. 
Farmers must pay H2A workers the highest of the state or federal minimum wage; the applicable 
collective bargaining wage, if any; the prevailing wage rate documented by the government; or 
the Adverse Effect Wage Rate, which is set for a calendar year. The AEWR is the best choice for 
the model since it is higher than government-set minimum wages. Collective bargaining in the 
H2A program is rare outside of North Carolina, and even those fieldworker unions typically 
accept the AEWR as the governing wage rate. The prevailing wages documented by the 
government vary by sub-regions within a state and do not cover all agricultural sectors. As a 
result, prevailing wages cannot be incorporated into data aggregated at a statewide level. 
  Unfortunately, the wage data self-reported by farmers is likely subject to measurement 
error. Even though growers are required to pay H2A workers the highest of several categories of 
wages, U.S. Department of Labor records show growers in Georgia still self-report paying H2A 
workers the federal minimum wage of $7.25 even though the AEWR is considerably higher. This 
means employers are either ignorant of H2A program requirements, deliberately cheating 
workers, or complying with the law but mistakenly completing government paperwork. 
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 The author lagged the AEWR by three and six months since farmers likely consider labor 
wage rates prior to deciding whether to apply for H2A workers. A minimum three-month lag is 
appropriate because farmers must start their H2A application process with a state labor agency 
75 days prior to when they want H2A workers to arrive. Though it is a subjective judgment, the 
author also conducted the regressions using a six-month lag in the AEWR since farmers probably 
consider wage costs and decide whether to participate prior to the paperwork deadlines. Either 
way, a short lag is appropriate since the U.S. Department of Labor typically publishes its state-
specific AEWR wages in the Federal Register no later than the start of the spring planting 
season. Once published, the AEWR wages generally remain constant for the rest of the calendar 
year. Only farmers who need H2A labor very early in the calendar year would face much 
uncertainty about future AEWR wages. Since the AEWR is a weighted average of livestock and 
produce-sector wages in a given state, state farming associations can predict the likely AEWR 
wage with reasonable accuracy. 
 Last, each observation contains a law*post binary variable indicating whether a state had 
a mandatory, weak or encouraged E-Verify law in effect when the H2A workers were scheduled 
to start working. 
 Farmers applied to import 72,656 workers into the United States during calendar year 
2007, a sum that increased to 103,698 workers in 2014 (See Table 2). The requests for workers 
appeared to dip during the Great Recession and its aftermath, and then gradually recovered (See 
Figure 1). The broad trend for the United States masks a great deal of state variation in H2A 
applications (See Figure 2). Curiously, the greatest increase in H2A usages in recent years 
occurred in states with weak E-Verify laws, for example, North Carolina, rather than those states 
with mandatory E-Verify laws. 
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 It is difficult to make causal connections by visually observing the trends. North Carolina 
experienced sharp growth in its E-Verify utilization. While the growth appears to begin after an 
E-Verify rule takes effect, it remains unclear whether there is a causal connection (See Figure 2). 
Other factors could be at play. For example, farmers in North Carolina use a cooperative called 
the North Carolina Growers Association to file H2A applications. The cooperative is now one of 
the largest H2A applicants in the United States. Consequently, the increase in usage could 
represent efficiency gains or local preference, not the effect of immigration crackdowns. 
  H2A usage in Georgia increased as lawmakers debated adopting an E-Verify law. While 
the increase in H2A in usage may be the result of tighter E-Verify requirements, it could also 
reflect a recovery after a particularly deep recession (See Figure 2). Counterintuitively, H2A 
trend lines are nearly flat in Alabama despite the state’s strict E-Verify law.  
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Table 2: H2A Trends by State and Year 
State Y2007 Y2008 Y2009 Y2010 Y2011 Y2012 Y2013 Y2014 
State 
Totals 
Mandatory 
AL 523 720 584 520 613 701 650 648 4,959 
AZ 1,862 5,017 4,159 3,308 2,091 2,242 3,365 1,610 23,654 
MS 2,037 2,141 1,937 1,840 1,745 2,267 2,460 2,902 17,329 
UT 1,635 1,607 1,718 1,580 1,689 1,606 838 651 11,324 
Weak 
GA 6,876 7,173 6,510 5,128 6,475 7,887 9,330 9,897 59,276 
NC 8,801 9,228 8,722 9,396 9,129 10,481 12,386 15,135 83,278 
Encouraged 
LA 5,189 6,007 6,911 6,494 7,113 6,786 6,684 6,516 51,700 
MO 310 408 354 305 267 226 327 594 2,791 
OK 485 605 608 535 455 430 470 462 4,050 
SC 2,265 1,979 2,743 1,240 2,565 3,140 2,945 2,440 19,317 
TN 2,436 2,276 2,425 2,170 1,926 2,240 2,558 2,834 18,865 
Government 
CO 2,274 2,535 2,331 1,575 1,045 1,052 1,113 1,488 13,413 
FL 2,212 5,870 5,000 4,571 6,577 8,646 11,196 6,357 50,429 
ID 1,658 2,418 2,246 2,536 1,799 1,987 2,044 1,998 16,686 
IN 197 132 101 71 119 463 1,017 929 3,029 
MI 591 469 463 277 276 344 585 1,317 4,322 
NE 217 200 223 220 240 259 379 497 2,235 
PA 307 609 709 614 517 557 575 675 4,563 
VA 2,809 2,763 2,612 2,455 2,647 2,175 2,657 3,214 21,332 
RI 11 12 2 25 7 4 5 4 70 
NONE 
AR 2,894 3,319 3,041 2,836 2,471 2,712 2,783 2,500 22,556 
AK 24 30 31 20 22 22 20 15 184 
CA 2,255 4,370 3,173 2,298 1,774 3,249 4,291 4,994 26,404 
CT 772 655 386 362 290 721 833 408 4,427 
DE 85 76 57 46 38 32 32 32 398 
HI 75 224 200 175 114 122 21 39 970 
IA 733 1,796 1,386 846 1,168 1,212 1,557 1,085 9,783 
IL 367 764 525 543 570 784 805 867 5,225 
KS 865 1,087 906 799 839 730 678 631 6,535 
KY 4,907 5,808 5,716 5,443 4,686 4,755 5,804 6,757 43,876 
MA 689 692 558 442 487 449 457 432 4,206 
MD 784 1,098 873 616 624 639 640 608 5,882 
ME 559 638 1,003 627 614 586 519 640 5,186 
MN 512 955 691 721 521 750 729 965 5,844 
MT 534 590 518 171 418 479 484 564 3,758 
ND 649 878 973 825 837 898 913 1,102 7,075 
14 
 
NH 258 273 280 135 205 153 181 163 1,648 
NJ 407 661 580 457 454 548 598 648 4,353 
NM 384 423 545 548 568 124 152 158 2,902 
NV 1,832 1,997 1,927 1,680 1,762 1,682 1,769 1,874 14,523 
NY 3,987 4,190 4,315 3,852 3,949 3,650 4,697 4,638 33,278 
OH 1,076 1,153 1,216 924 733 770 762 845 7,479 
OR 86 81 128 48 68 89 70 192 762 
SD 428 514 578 452 555 560 561 616 4,264 
TX 1,980 3,117 2,850 2,185 1,998 2,045 2,066 2,394 18,635 
VT 450 501 456 432 454 419 466 489 3,667 
WA 1,790 2,575 1,986 3,015 3,194 4,443 6,349 9,055 32,407 
WI 174 332 376 142 120 171 178 490 1,983 
WV 39 37 48 42 38 134 34 37 409 
WY 366 379 395 402 290 304 307 224 2,667 
Blank             10 68 78 
Annual Total 72,656 91,382 86,075 75,944 77,156 86,725 100,350 103,698 693,986 
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Figure 1: U.S. H2A Workers Certified 
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Figure 2: H2A Worker Utilization by States with E-Verify Laws Affecting Agriculture 
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To better explore how H2A labor use responded to the E-Verify laws, the following fixed-effects 
difference-in-differences models are employed.  
 Model 1 
log(𝐻2𝐴 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠)𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑦1𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2008 + … + 𝛽𝑦𝑛𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2014 + 𝛽𝑚1𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝐹𝑒𝑏𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑦 + ⋯
+ 𝛽𝑚11𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽𝑠1𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑚𝑎 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑠48𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑊𝑦𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝛽𝑤log(𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝐸𝑊𝑅) + 𝛽𝑒3𝐸𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑦(𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦) + 𝜇 
 Model 2 
log(𝐻2𝐴 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠)𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑦1𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2008 + … + 𝛽𝑦𝑛𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2014 + 𝛽𝑚1𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝐹𝑒𝑏𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑦 + ⋯
+ 𝛽𝑚11𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽𝑠1𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑚𝑎 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑠48𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑊𝑦𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝛽𝑤log(𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝐸𝑊𝑅) + 𝛽𝑒0𝐸𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑦(𝑛𝑜 𝑙𝑎𝑤) + 𝛽𝑒2𝐸𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑦(𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘)
+ 𝛽𝑒3𝐸𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑦(𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦) + 𝜇 
 Model 3 
log(𝐻2𝐴 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠)𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑦1𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2008 + … + 𝛽𝑦𝑛𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2014 + 𝛽𝑚1𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝐹𝑒𝑏𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑦 + ⋯
+ 𝛽𝑚11𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽𝑠1𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑚𝑎 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑠48𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑊𝑦𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝛽𝑤log(𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝐸𝑊𝑅) + 𝛽𝑒1,2𝐸𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑦(𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘)
+ 𝛽𝑒3𝐸𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑦(𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦) + 𝜇 
 In the models above, the omitted reference group of states is as follows: (Model 1) all 
states other than those with E-Verify(mandatory); (Model 2) states with E-Verify(encouraged); 
and (Model 3) states with no E-Verify law. Under the null hypothesis, the effect of E-Verify laws 
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(relative to the omitted group of states) on farmer applications for H2A workers is not 
statistically different from zero at a reasonable confidence level. 
Model 1:  
𝐻0: 𝛽𝑒3 = 0 
Model 2: 
𝐻0: 𝛽𝑒0, 𝛽𝑒2, 𝛽𝑒3 = 0 
Model 3: 
𝐻0: 𝛽𝑒1&2, 𝛽𝑒3 = 0 
 If the fixed-effect OLS regression rejects the null hypothesis at a reasonable confidence 
interval, then E-Verify laws may have an effect on farmer applications for H2A workers. 
Model 1: 
𝐻1: 𝛽𝑒3 ≠ 0 
Model 2: 
𝐻1: 𝛽𝑒0, 𝛽𝑒2, 𝛽𝑒3 ≠ 0 
Model 3: 
𝐻0: 𝛽𝑒1&2, 𝛽𝑒3 ≠ 0 
If the strength of state laws matters, differences should be observed in 𝛽𝑒0, 𝛽𝑒1, 𝛽𝑒2,  and 𝛽𝑒3. 
 Using a base year of 2007, the model incorporates additional intercepts for each calendar 
year from 2008 through 2014 to capture macroeconomic or other time-related national patterns. 
The month dummy variables control for the seasonality of the agricultural labor cycle. A 
separate intercept is included for each state except Alaska, which is omitted from the database 
because the government does not publish any AEWR for the small number of H2A workers 
there. Kentucky, which has no E-Verify laws, serves as the base state.  
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Table 3. OLS: Determinants of Monthly H2A workers - Years, Months, States, Adverse 
Effect Wage Rate, E-Verify Laws by Type 
 (Model 1) (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 2) 
VARIABLES 3-month 
AEWR lag 
6-month AEWR 
lag 
3-month AEWR 
lag 
6-month AEWR 
lag 
     
No E-Verify law   -0.137 -0.205 
   (0.172) (0.179) 
E-Verify weak   -0.0168 -0.0942 
   (0.305) (0.310) 
E-Verify mandatory -0.317 -0.360* -0.443* -0.550** 
 (0.201) (0.211) (0.258) (0.269) 
ln(AEWR): 3-month lag -0.633  -0.515  
 (0.998)  (1.007)  
ln(AEWR): 6-month lag  -0.655  -0.493 
  (1.029)  (1.039) 
Constant 5.434** 5.444** 5.333** 5.323** 
 (2.120) (2.189) (2.128) (2.196) 
     
Observations 4,704 4,557 4,704 4,557 
R-squared 0.492 0.490 0.492 0.490 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Controls for states, years and months are included and available on request.  
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Table 3A. OLS: Determinants of Monthly H2A workers - Years, Months, States, Adverse 
Effect Wage Rate, E-Verify Laws by Type; Clustered Errors 
 (Model 1) (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 2) 
VARIABLES 3-month 
AEWR lag 
6-month AEWR 
lag 
3-month AEWR 
lag 
6-month AEWR 
lag 
     
No E-Verify law   -0.137 -0.205 
   (0.123) (0.142) 
E-Verify weak   -0.0168 -0.0942 
   (0.125) (0.146) 
E-Verify mandatory -0.317*** -0.360*** -0.443*** -0.550*** 
 (0.0988) (0.0776) (0.143) (0.152) 
ln(AEWR): 3-month lag -0.633  -0.515  
 (1.154)  (1.161)  
ln(AEWR): 6-month lag  -0.655  -0.493 
  (1.175)  (1.190) 
Constant 5.434** 5.444** 5.333** 5.323** 
 (2.407) (2.484) (2.402) (2.499) 
     
Observations 4,704 4,557 4,704 4,557 
R-squared 0.492 0.490 0.492 0.490 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Controls for states, years and months are included and available on request. 
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Table 4. WLS: Determinants of Monthly H2A workers - Years, Months, States, Adverse 
Effect Wage Rate, E-Verify Laws by Type 
 (Model 2) (Model 2) 
VARIABLES 3-month AEWR lag 6-month AEWR lag 
   
No E-Verify law 0.0701 0.0910 
 (0.0967) (0.0980) 
E-Verify weak -0.184 -0.212 
 (0.194) (0.197) 
E-Verify mandatory -0.116 -0.248 
 (0.226) (0.196) 
ln(AEWR): 3-month lag -1.697  
 (1.294)  
ln(AEWR): 6-month lag  -3.449** 
  (1.436) 
Observations 4,704 4,557 
R-squared 0.235 0.240 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Controls for states, years and months are included and available on request.  
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Table 4A. WLS: Determinants of Monthly H2A workers - Years, Months, States, Adverse 
Effect Wage Rate, E-Verify Laws by Type; Clustered Errors 
 (Model 2) (Model 2) 
VARIABLES 3-month AEWR lag 6-month AEWR lag 
   
No E-Verify law 0.0701 0.0910 
 (0.105) (0.118) 
E-Verify weak -0.184* -0.212** 
 (0.0941) (0.0937) 
E-Verify mandatory -0.116 -0.248*** 
 (0.159) (0.0859) 
ln(AEWR): 3-month lag -1.697  
 (1.141)  
ln(AEWR): 6-month lag  -3.449* 
  (1.846) 
Constant 4.452* 8.094** 
 (2.414) (3.865) 
   
Observations 4,704 4,557 
R-squared 0.235 0.240 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Controls for states, years and months are included and available on request. 
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Table 5. OLS: Determinants of Monthly H2A workers - Years, Months, States, Adverse 
Effect Wage Rate, Encouraged and Weak E-Verify Laws, Mandatory E-Verify Law 
 (Model 3) (Model 3) 
VARIABLES 3-month AEWR lag 6-month AEWR lag 
   
Encouraged or weak E-Verify law 0.132 0.176 
 (0.147) (0.151) 
E-Verify mandatory -0.306 -0.345 
 (0.202) (0.211) 
ln(AEWR): 3-month lag -0.514  
 (1.006)  
ln(AEWR): 6-month lag  -0.489 
  (1.039) 
Constant 5.194** 5.110** 
 (2.137) (2.207) 
   
Observations 4,704 4,557 
R-squared 0.492 0.490 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Controls for states, years and months are included and available on request. 
 
Table 5A. OLS: Determinants of Monthly H2A workers - Years, Months, States, Adverse 
Effect Wage Rate, Encouraged and Weak E-Verify Laws, Mandatory E-Verify Law; 
Clustered Errors 
 (Model 3) (Model 3) 
VARIABLES 3-month AEWR lag 6-month AEWR lag 
   
Encouraged or weak E-Verify law 0.132 0.176 
 (0.0966) (0.108) 
E-Verify mandatory -0.306*** -0.345*** 
 (0.100) (0.0800) 
ln(AEWR): 3-month lag -0.514  
 (1.160)  
ln(AEWR): 6-month lag  -0.489 
  (1.188) 
Constant 5.194** 5.110** 
 (2.416) (2.507) 
   
Observations 4,704 4,557 
R-squared 0.492 0.490 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Controls for states, years and months are included and available on request. 
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Table 6. WLS: Determinants of Monthly H2A workers - Years, Months, States, Adverse 
Effect Wage Rate, Encouraged and Weak E-Verify Laws, Mandatory E-Verify Law 
 (Model 3) (Model 3) 
VARIABLES 3-month AEWR lag 6-month AEWR lag 
   
Encouraged or weak E-Verify law -0.134 -0.165* 
 (0.0910) (0.0929) 
E-Verify mandatory -0.187 -0.339* 
 (0.218) (0.184) 
ln(AEWR): 3-month lag -1.672  
 (1.285)  
ln(AEWR): 6-month lag  -3.424** 
  (1.426) 
Constant 4.470 8.131*** 
 (2.764) (3.077) 
   
Observations 4,704 4,557 
R-squared 0.235 0.240 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Controls for states, years and months are included and available on request. 
 
Table 6A. WLS: Determinants of Monthly H2A workers - Years, Months, States, Adverse 
Effect Wage Rate, Encouraged and Weak E-Verify Laws, Mandatory E-Verify Law; 
Clustered Errors 
 (Model 3) (Model 3) 
VARIABLES 3-month AEWR lag 6-month AEWR lag 
   
Encouraged or weak E-Verify law -0.134 -0.165 
 (0.112) (0.132) 
3: E-Verify mandatory -0.187 -0.339*** 
 (0.164) (0.101) 
ln(AEWR): 3-month lag -1.672  
 (1.139)  
ln(AEWR): 6-month lag  -3.424* 
  (1.847) 
Constant 4.470* 8.131** 
 (2.471) (3.950) 
   
Observations 4,704 4,557 
R-squared 0.235 0.240 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Controls for states, years and months are included and available on request. 
  
25 
 
 F-tests conducted in each OLS regression show the dependent variables are jointly 
significant and yielded adjusted R-squared ratios of 48 percent. The controls for years produce 
few statistically significant findings, with the exception of 2008. The controls for month (with 
January the omitted reference month) are all statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence 
level, which is not surprising given the seasonality of planting and harvesting cycles for labor-
intensive crops. Additionally, the coefficients for about 40 states tested statistically significant 
(as compared to Kentucky) at a 90 percent level of confidence or more, most states having 
significantly lower usage of H2A workers but two with higher levels (Georgia and Louisiana). 
 Models 1 & 2: The coefficients for the three- and six-month lagged AEWR are negative 
as would be expected with a downward-sloping demand curve for labor (See Table 3). However, 
they are not statistically significant and exhibit high P-values. The lack of significance may 
reflect the inherent endogeneity of the employment-wage relationship. Labor demand is 
inversely related to the wage, all else the same, but shifts in labor demand are positively 
associated with wages.  
 The coefficients for the law*post E-Verify mandatory dummy were strongly negative and 
statistically different from zero (i.e., no-law states) at confidence intervals of greater than 10 
percent in three out of four OLS regression models. A Wald test failed to reject the null 
hypothesis that 𝛽𝑒0 = 𝛽𝑒3 and 𝛽𝑒2 = 𝛽𝑒3 at the 90 percent confidence level or greater. However, 
the resulting p-values are as low as 10.2 and 13 percent. 
 Model 3: A separate fixed-effects regression tested the strength of mandatory E-Verify 
against encouraged or weak-law states as a group. These models twice produced coefficients for 
the law*post E-Verify dummies that were strongly negative but not statistically different from 
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zero (i.e., no-law states) at confidence intervals of 90 percent and greater. However, the p-values 
for the coefficients corresponding with mandatory laws tested just above 10 and 13 percent. 
When the regression model included a six-month lagged AEWR, a Wald test found strong 
statistical evidence that 𝛽𝑒3 ≠ 𝛽𝑒1,2 at a confidence level of greater than 90 percent.  
 WLS: In the OLS results shown previously, each state is weighted the same, regardless 
of the size of its agricultural sector. Rather than allowing each state to count equally, one can 
adjust the impact of each state’s impact on the regression estimates to vary by the size of its 
agricultural sector. To do so, the author repeated the fixed-effects regression using a weighted 
least squares method. To construct a weight reflecting labor-intensive agriculture, the author 
used the total number of crop workers reported each month by state in the U.S. Department of 
Labor’s Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. This dataset omits smaller growers but 
represents the best state-level agricultural labor force estimates available.   
Regression results display sensitivity to the move from unweighted to weighted least 
squares estimation. The WLS results produced no statistically significant findings for E-Verify 
coefficients in Model 2 (See Table 4). However, a WLS estimation using Model 3 showed the 
coefficients for encouraged and weak E-Verify laws as a group and mandatory E-Verify laws 
were negative and statistically significant at confidence levels of greater than 90 percent (See 
Table 6). Once again, the coefficient for the dummy representing mandatory E-Verify laws was 
more negative than the dummy for weaker laws. 
Clustering: To the extent that residuals within states are correlated, standard error 
estimates may be biased. The author repeated each fixed-effect regression using clustering at the 
state level. The clustered errors associated with the AEWR wage rates tended to be larger than 
the un-clustered standard errors, as is common. However, the cluster-robust errors associated 
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with the coefficients for various E-Verify laws decreased. The regressions with cluster-robust 
errors produced strongly negative coefficients at the 99 percent confidence level for mandatory 
E-Verify laws in Model 1 and Model 2 (See Table 3A). When using clustered errors combined 
with WLS, the negative coefficients for weak E-Verify laws tested statistically significant at 
confidence levels of 90 percent or greater (See Table 4A). Once again, the coefficients for 
mandatory E-Verify laws were negative and statistically significant at a confidence level of 
greater than 99 percent. The drop in the error terms implies that employers within a state have 
residuals negatively correlated with the residuals of other employers in the state. That negative 
correlation may arise because the supply of H2A workers within a state is relatively fixed. 
U.S. law imposes no cap on the number of H2A workers admitted to the United States, 
but practical considerations may effectively impose short-run limits on the H2A labor supply. 
First, farmers must decide whether to import workers at least three or more months before 
growers need the workers to arrive. Therefore, the supply of H2A workers is effectively fixed 
during critical planting and harvesting periods. Multiple farmers have said in interviews they 
prefer employing the same H2A workers over several years because it reduces training costs and 
generally improves worker productivity. This preference may impose another practical supply 
constraint. U.S. Department of Labor data show many farmers rely on large contractors to recruit 
H2A workers abroad, mainly in Mexico. These contractors often recruit from the same clusters 
of families or regions, which could make it difficult to dramatically increase the H2A worker 
supply in the short-run. To the extent contractors supply one farmer with a large supply of 
workers, those workers are unavailable to another farmer. Last, H2A workers must remain 
employed with the same grower or grower group during the length of their stay in the United 
States, which reduces workforce mobility. 
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 Overall, the findings partially reject the null hypothesis since 𝛽𝑒3 ≠ 0 at the 90 percent 
confidence interval or greater in several models. The suggestion that the strongest E-Verify laws 
may decrease H2A usage coupled with the failure to identify any statistically significant 
evidence that E-Verify laws encourage H2A usage calls into question whether state leaders are 
achieving their policy objectives in the agricultural sector. Interestingly, states with laws 
encouraging or weakly requiring that farmers use the E-Verify system exhibit higher use (by 
roughly 11 and 23 percent) in H2A hiring than do states without a law, although the difference is 
outside the range of statistical significance. A more surprising result is that states with laws 
making E-Verify use mandatory exhibit substantially lower H2A hiring than those states with 
weaker laws, a difference of roughly 43 (about 35 percent) lower, when using a three-month 
lagged AEWR wage. When using a six-month lagged AEWR wage, the difference was roughly 
46 log points (about 37 percent). 
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Conclusion 
 State lawmakers started requiring employers to use the E-Verify system in the hope it 
would deter illegal immigrants from the workforce and potentially booster employment 
opportunities for legal residents, including in the agricultural sector. Supporters of E-Verify laws 
expected farmers could increasingly find legal labor by using the federal H2A program. 
However, the available statistical evidence calls into question whether these goals can be 
achieved in the agriculture industry. This study found no statistical evidence that E-Verify laws 
increase farmer usage of the H2A program. Counterintuitively, there is evidence suggesting the 
strictest state-level E-Verify laws actually discourage farmers from using the H2A system. 
 Given the high own-price elasticity for agricultural goods, farmers have an incentive to 
carefully consider whether the cost of complying with E-Verify rules outweighs the risk-adjusted 
cost of getting caught. In states that merely encourage or have weak E-Verify requirements, a 
rational farmer may be reluctant to comply. State governments have few resources for enforcing 
E-Verify laws. Even some of the strictest laws appear little more than paper tigers. In a telling 
example, Mississippi grants its agriculture industry no exemptions from its E-Verify laws. But it 
has no track record of enforcement, either. A spokeswoman for the Mississippi Attorney 
General’s Office, Jan Schaefer, told state lawmakers in late 2010 that prosecutors had not 
received a single complaint alleging violations of the state’s E-Verify law (Crisp, 2010). 
Schaefer said the attorney general’s office would investigate any such complaints, though she 
added that prosecutors had not received any additional funding or resources for those new 
responsibilities. To be effective, E-Verify laws may need to be combined with a broader 
immigration overhaul that includes a credible threat of labor law enforcement. 
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 Prior research helps explain why the toughest E-Verify laws may substantially decrease 
usage of the H2A program. When analyzing Current Population Survey data in states with E-
Verify laws, Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak (2012) concluded the laws reduced the number of 
suspected illegal workers in higher-paying and better-regulated jobs such as construction. Yet the 
E-Verify laws appeared to increase the share of workers in the agricultural sector who fit the 
demographic profile of illegal laborers. It appeared that as employers in more formal sectors of 
the economy complied with the new E-Verify law, illegal workers were pushed into the lower-
paying agricultural sector, which traditionally is less strict about labor law compliance. If strict 
E-Verify laws force more illegal immigrants into the agricultural sector, farmers benefit from an 
increased supply of local labor. The low probability of enforcement combined with the glut of 
available illegal labor would decrease a farmer’s incentives to seek labor through the more-costly 
H2A program.  
 Further research is recommended on several fronts. If the U.S. Department of Labor 
released firm-specific identifiers with its H2A usage data, economists could better study the 
determinants of H2A utilization on a micro scale. A better understanding of the determinants of 
H2A program usage could help researchers more precisely measure the effects of state-level E-
Verify laws.  
 If better firm-level data were available, it would be worth testing whether larger growers 
tend to increase their H2A usage at higher rates than smaller growers once E-Verify laws take 
effect. Even when laws are tightened, small growers may remain confident in their ability to hire 
a handful of additional laborers for planting or harvest. By contrast, large growers need hundreds 
of workers during unpredictable harvest windows. If an E-Verify law disrupts the labor market, 
larger growers may struggle to fill their labor needs, resulting in a potential loss of crops and 
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revenue. As a result, the benefits of using the H2A program for a large farmer may outweigh the 
program’s extra costs. The marginal cost of applying for H2A labor may be cheaper for large 
farmers since they already employ back-office professional staff who can help oversee the 
bureaucratic, time-consuming H2A application process. Smaller growers would need to hire 
additional staff or use expensive H2A contractors. Last, federal immigration and labor officials 
with scarce investigative resources are more likely to target large growers since those cases 
involve larger numbers of workers, bigger potential fines, and may produce a greater deterrence 
effect. If larger growers are aware of enforcement trends, they may seek the legal cover the H2A 
program provides. 
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Appendix A: State E-Verify Laws 
 
Mandatory States 
 
Alabama 
 
 Alabama lawmakers in 2011 passed one of the strictest E-Verify laws in the county. 
Public Act No. 2011-535 requires that all “business entities” (Alabama, 2011) enroll to use E-
Verify by April 1, 2012.  The act broadly defines business entities as a person or group of people 
engaging in any activity for “gain, benefit, advantage, or livelihood” (Alabama, 2011) regardless 
of whether that work is performed for profit.  The act specifically defines corporations, limited 
liability companies, partnerships, and trusts as business entities. 
Arizona 
 Arizona became the first state to require that employers use the E-Verify system as part 
of House Bill 2779, which then-Gov. Janet Napolitano signed into law on July 2, 2007. The law, 
known as the “Legal Arizona Workers Act,” requires that all employers use the E-Verify system 
to make sure new hires were legally eligible to work in the United States. Employers were 
required to use E-Verify starting on Jan. 1, 2008 (Arizona, 2007). 
 Employers caught knowingly employing an illegal immigrant would be put on a three-
year probation period. While on probation, those employers must file quarterly reports with the 
county attorney documenting all new hires. State judges in Arizona can order a business owner 
who violates the law to file an affidavit within three days promising the business has fired all 
employees hired illegally and promising not to hire illegal workers in the future. If that affidavit 
is not submitted within three days, the court can order the suspension of a firm’s business license 
until the affidavit is filed. Licenses are suspended for the business location where a violation 
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occurred. A firm with a single location or a statewide license would risk the suspension of its 
entire operations until the employer submits the affidavit (Arizona, 2007). The court can require 
a 10-day business license suspension if judges feel such a punishment is warranted given the 
facts of the case.  
 Intentional violations, considered more serious than a “knowing” violation, result in a 
five-year probationary period, a minimum 10-day business license suspension, and quarterly 
monitoring (Arizona, 2007). The employer must also file an affidavit promising the owner has 
fired any illegal immigrants and will refrain from hiring illegal workers in the future. Employers 
caught breaking the law a second time while on probation forfeit their business licenses, 
effectively ending their ability to operate in Arizona.  
 Lawmakers in Arizona used a carrot-and-stick approach to nudge businesses into 
following the law. While employers face sanctions for hiring illegal immigrants, participating in 
the now-mandatory E-Verify program gives an employer a rebuttable defense (Arizona, 2007) 
that the firm was complying with state labor laws. 
 The following year, lawmakers streamlined several portions of the act in House Bill 
2745. Among the major changes, lawmakers better explained the definitions between knowing 
and intentional violations (Arizona, 2008). The rest of the legislation had little impact on the E-
Verify requirements. 
Mississippi 
 Gov. Haley Barbour, a Republican, signed Senate Bill 2988, which contained sweeping 
measures targeting illegal immigrants in the public and private workforce. Under the legislation, 
all employers in Mississippi must use the E-Verify system to confirm the work eligibility all new 
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hires (Mississippi, 2008). Employers were required to meet the following E-Verify registration 
deadlines: 
 July 1, 2008: Employers with 250 or more workers; 
 July 1, 2009: Employers with 100 or more workers; 
 July 1, 2010: Employers with 30 or more workers; 
 July 1, 2011: All other employers. 
 In addition, all state contractors were required to use E-Verify if they hoped to secure 
government contracts effective July 2, 2008. 
 The penalties for violations are harsh, if enforced. People who knowingly work while 
they are illegal immigrants commit a felony offense punishable by a maximum five years in 
prison and a $10,000 fine. Firms caught hiring illegal immigrants could lose their ability to win 
state contracts for up to three years and face a potential loss of any government-issued licenses 
for a maximum of one year.  
Utah 
 In 2008, Utah passed Senate Bill 81 requiring public employers to use E-Verify to check 
the employment eligibility status of new hires starting July 1, 2009 (Utah, 2008). Public 
employers cannot enter into contracts for the performance of services unless the contractor is 
enrolled in E-Verify. The law did not affect private employers. 
 Gov. Gary Herbert, a Republican, signed Senate Bill 251 into law on March 31, 2010, 
which focused on private employers (Utah, 2010). The law required private employers with 15 or 
more workers to vet new hires using the federal E-Verify system starting July 1, 2010. The law 
does not set any penalties for noncompliance. 
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 Apparently frustrated by federal inaction, Utah authorities authorized the state to create 
its own guest worker program upon receiving federal approval or June 1, 2013, whichever came 
first (Utah, 2011). Once the state guest worker program started, employers with 15 or more 
employees would be required to use E-Verify to identify their new hires were in the country 
legally or had a Utah-issued guest worker permit. The proposed state worker program would 
have contained civil penalties for noncompliance. As of yet, Utah has not secured federal 
permission to start its state guest worker program, and the law has therefore not taken effect. 
 
Weak States 
Georgia 
 Politicians in Georgia first required that public employers and government contractors 
use E-Verify, then gradually forced private industry to use the system. 
 In 2006, then-Gov. Sonny Perdue signed into law a requirement that public employers 
use E-Verify to vet their new hires starting the following year. Government contractors were also 
required to use the system (Georgia, 2006). The requirement was implemented in a three-step 
process. Public employers and contractors with 500 or more employers were required to use E-
Verify starting July 1, 2007. Those with 100 or more employees had to start using the system on 
July 1, 2008. Finally, all public employers and subcontractors were forced to use the system on 
July 1, 2009. 
 State legislators apparently worried that municipal governments and other employers 
were seeking to evade the newly established requirements. A new law effective Jan. 1, 2010, 
made clear that local governments were required to use the E-Verify system (Georgia, 2009). 
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The new law also required that contractors file documents proving they used E-Verify before 
bidding on public contracts. 
 Politicians in Georgia enacted more sweeping changes to immigration law in 2011. After 
a lengthy and contentious debate, lawmakers voted overwhelmingly to adopt House Bill 87, 
which Gov. Nathan Deal signed on May 13, 2011 (Georgia, 2011). The new law included the 
first requirements that all private employers, not just government contractors, use the E-Verify 
system. The legislation established three deadlines for E-Verify use: 
 Jan. 1, 2012, for employers with 500 or more employees; 
 July 1, 2012 for employers with 100 or more employees but less than 500; 
 July 1, 2013 for employers with more than 10 employees but less than 100. 
 Employers would determine whether they were subject to Georgia’s E-Verify 
requirements based on the number of workers a firm employed on the first day of the year. The 
law defined employees broadly to mean a worker for whom an employer collected withholding 
taxes and who worked no less than 35 hours weekly (Georgia, 2011). Since many agricultural 
growers employ few workers in January, many may be exempt from E-Verify requirements. 
North Carolina 
 Gov. Beverly Perdue, a Democrat, signed a law on Aug. 23, 2007, requiring all state 
government branches to use the E-Verify system to make sure all new hires were legally eligible 
for employment in the United States. This requirements extended to all North Carolina agencies, 
departments, institutions, universities, community colleges and local education agencies (North 
Carolina, 2006).  
 State leaders enacted more sweeping laws on June 23, 2011. House Bill 36  requires any 
employer with 25 or more employees to use the E-Verify system to verify work eligibility (North 
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Carolina, 2011). Employers accused of a fist violation would have to file an affidavit stating the 
employer has consulted with the worker in question and requested a “verification of work 
authorization through E-Verify.” Employers who do not file such an affidavit must pay a 
$10,000 fine. A second violation results in a civil penalty of $1,000 regardless of the number of 
workers involved. A third violation triggers a $2,000 penalty for every worker the employer 
failed to check using the E-Verify system.  
 Enforcement was phased-in on the following schedule: 
 Oct. 1, 2012: Employers with 500 or more workers must comply; 
 Jan. 1, 2013: Employers with 100 or more workers must comply; 
 July 1, 2013: Employers with 25 or more workers must comply. 
 The law creates a giant, acknowledged loophole for the agriculture industry. The rules do 
not apply to seasonal, temporary employees who work 90 days or fewer during a consecutive 12-
month period (North Carolina, 2011). This would exempt many migrant agricultural workers 
employed during the harvest of labor-intensive commodity crops. 
 The loophole benefiting the agriculture industry was further widened in legislation 
adopted on Sept. 4, 2013. Instead of just exempting workers employed 90 days or fewer, it was 
expanded to nearly nine months (North Carolina, 2013). Republican Gov. Pat McCrory vetoed 
the legislation on Aug. 15, 2013, shortly after its adoption by the North Carolina General 
Assembly. 
 “This bill has been thinly disguised as a measure to help our farming community when in 
fact it applies to a broad spectrum of other businesses in both urban and rural areas,” McCrory 
wrote (2013). “This is a loophole that would allow businesses to exempt a higher percentage of 
employees from proving they are legal U.S. citizens or residents.” 
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 North Carolina lawmakers overrode McCrory’s veto on Sept. 4, 2013, making the bill a 
binding state law (North Carolina, 2014).  
Encouraged States: 
Louisiana 
 Louisiana lawmakers stiffened penalties for hiring illegal immigrants in the private sector 
starting Aug. 15, 2011 (Louisiana, 2014). Public Act No. 402 doubled the financial penalties for 
employing illegal immigrants for first and second offenses (Louisiana, 2011b). Although E-
Verify is not mandatory, the legislation includes harsh penalties for violators more common in 
states that made the E-Verify system mandatory. A third offense would result in a business 
license suspension of 30 days to six months and a fine of $2,500 for every illegal immigrant 
unlawfully employed. Employers using E-Verify would be exempt from punishments so long as 
they adhered to other, existing record-keeping requirements, including retaining a job applicant’s 
immigration-related records. 
 In 2011, state lawmakers adopted Act No. 376, requiring that firms bidding for public 
contract to use the E-Verify system starting Jan. 1, 2012. Proof that a firm used the E-Verify 
system would provide a presumptive defense if the company was later accused of civil or 
criminal violations involving immigration-related labor laws. The legislation did not explain how 
state authorities would enforce E-Verify use, and it contained a large loophole for 
subcontractors. Under the provision, a contractor cannot be sanctioned for a subcontractor’s 
violation unless the contract has “actual knowledge” of violations (Louisiana, 2011a). The 
following year, the Legislature passed Act No. 142, further clarifying that a public works project 
means the “erection, construction, alteration, improvement, or repair of any public facility or 
immovable property owned, used, or leased by a public entity.” (Louisiana, 2012) 
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Missouri 
 Businesses are forbidden from knowingly hiring illegal immigrants under House Bill 
1549, which was effective Jan. 1, 2009. Any firm receiving a state contract worth more than 
$5,000 must register for E-Verify under the law (Missouri, 2008). Firms that receive state tax 
credits or loans must also use E-Verify. While not required, using E-Verify is an affirmative 
defense for an employer accused of violating the law. Knowingly employing an illegal 
immigrant is punishable by a loss of government-issued permits and licenses for 14 days. A 
second violation is punishable by a one-year suspension of those licenses and permits. A third 
violation would result in permanent suspension. The original law denied some forms of public 
assistance to illegal immigrants, and lawmakers followed up the following year in House Bill 
390 to modify the definition of the affected assistance (Missouri, 2009). 
Oklahoma 
 House Bill 1804, adopted on May 8, 2007, requires that all public employers use E-
Verify to check the work eligibility of new hires starting July 1, 2008 (Oklahoma, 2007). 
Contractors and subcontractors awarded public contracts must use E-Verify to check the work 
eligibility of all new employees. The law makes it illegal to knowingly replace a legal worker 
with an illegal worker. Employers participating in the E-Verify program are exempt from any 
liability in connection with the new law. 
South Carolina 
 The agriculture industry successfully evaded E-Verify rules put into place for other 
employers. State leaders adopted House Bill 4400 in 2008 requiring private employers with 100 
or more employees to either use E-Verify to vet new hires or only hire those with South 
Carolina-approved identity documents starting July 1, 2009 (South Carolina, 2008).  Firms with 
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fewer than 100 employees had to meet the same requirements starting July 1, 2010. Firms that 
ignored the rules were subject to an escalating series of fines and license suspensions. However, 
a little-noticed loophole exempted agricultural employers, domestic and personal service 
workers, and clergy. In 2011, that law was amended to make E-Verify the sole verification 
option for private employers (South Carolina, 2011). The amended law also pushed back the 
compliance deadline until Jan. 1, 2012. 
Tennessee 
 The Tennessee Lawful Employment Act of 2011 requires that governmental and private 
employers with six or more employees verify each new hire’s work eligibility by either 
examining defined documents (for example, a valid driver’s license or government birth 
certificate) or using the federal E-Verify program (Tennessee, 2011). The rules took effect on: 
o Jan. 1, 2012: Government entities and private employers with 500 or more 
workers; 
o July 1, 2012: Private employers with 200 or more workers; 
o Jan. 1, 2013 Private employers with six or more employees. 
 Firms caught violating the rules face fines ranging from $500 to $2,500 per affected 
employee for each violation and suspension of business licenses. 
Government 
Colorado 
 Laws passed from 2006 through 2008 require that government contractors use E-Verify. 
Florida 
 Gov. Rick Scott required Florida’s state agencies use E-Verify to establish the 
employment eligibility of current and new agency hires (Scott, 2011). Contractors with the state 
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government must also use E-Verify to verify the status of their employees while performing 
government work within Florida. 
Idaho 
 Gov. C.L. “Butch” Otter signed an executive order in 2009 requiring the state 
government to verify that new hires were legally authorized to work in the United States (Otter, 
2009). Otter’s order did not specify the process for making these eligibility checks. To satisfy the 
order, Idaho’s state government now uses the E-Verify system to screen the eligibility of new 
hires (Idaho, 2014). 
Indiana 
 Lawmakers passed legislation in 2011 requiring the state government to use E-Verify to 
screen new hires starting June 30, 2011 (Indiana, 2011). Contractors to the state and other 
business entities selling the state government more than $1,000 in goods and services were also 
required to sign an affidavit proving they used E-Verify. The law does not otherwise affect 
private employers. 
Michigan 
 Lawmakers passed a budget for the fiscal year beginning Oct. 1, 2012, that forced the 
Michigan Department of Human Service and the Michigan Department of Transportation to 
require its contractors and subcontractors use the E-Verify system. Contractors and 
subcontractors must submit a certification to the state proving they are enrolled to use the E-
Verify system. No such rules have been placed on the private-sector workforce. 
Nebraska 
 All public employers and contractors shall use E-Verify to verify the employment 
eligibility of new hires starting Oct. 1, 2009 under Legislative Bill 403 (Nebraska, 2009). The 
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Nebraska Department of Labor was required to publicize the availability of the E-Verify service 
to all employers, but none of those firms except state contractors are required to use it. The 
Nebraska Tax Commission cannot approve various tax credits to a taxpayer unless the taxpayer 
shows that all employees have been electronically verified.  
Pennsylvania 
 A law adopted July 5, 2012, requires that contractors seeking government work use the 
E-Verify system to check the work eligibility of their employees starting Jan. 1, 2013 
(Pennsylvania, 2012). Violators are subject to fines and can be barred from seeking public 
contracts.  
Virginia 
 All state agencies must use E-Verify to check the work eligibility of new hires starting 
Dec. 1, 2012, under House Bill 737. The legislation was adopted on April 11, 2010. Any 
employer with 50 or more workers over the previous 12 months and seeking a state contract 
worth more than $50,000 must enroll in the E-Verify program by Dec. 1, 2013, under legislation 
approved in 2011 (Virginia, 2011).  Failure to comply can disbar a contractor from state 
contracts for one year.  
Rhode Island 
 Gov. Don Carcieri, a Republican, signed an executive order on March 27, 2008, requiring 
most executive branch agencies to use the E-Verify system to vet new hires in state government 
(Carcieri, 2008). His order also forced private firms contracting with the state government to use 
the E-Verify system. His successor, Lincoln Chafee, a Democrat, revoked the order on Jan. 5, 
2011 (Chafee, 2011). 
Other E-Verify Requirements 
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West Virginia 
 Any service provider whose workers who regularly have access to the state capitol 
complex must be vetted using E-Verify under legislation passed March 10, 2012 (West Virginia, 
2012). The law has no impact on other private employers. 
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